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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce and study Taxed Congestion Games with Failures [TCGFs],
extending congestion games with failures [CGFs] to consider costly task submission. We
deﬁne TCGFs, and prove that TCGFs possess a pure strategy equilibrium. Moreover, we
provide an eﬃcient algorithm for the computation of such equilibrium. We also provide
a specialized, simpler, algorithm for the case in which all resources are identical.
1 Introduction
Models of congestion arise from many real-life situations and have been analyzed by re-
searchers from several ﬁelds. Much of the research of congestion settings deals with the
model of congestion games introduced by Rosenthal [11]. In a congestion game, a player has
to choose from a ﬁnite set of resources, and the player’s payoﬀ depends only on the number of
players choosing his resources. Congestion games have been used to model network routing,
task allocation, demand for items to be produced, competition among ﬁrms for production
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1processes, migration of animals between diﬀerent habitats, etc. [1, 4, 7, 10, 11]. Given the
importance of congestion games, various generalizations of the basic model have been con-
sidered in the literature. In particular, congestion games have been generalized to local-eﬀect
games [2], to player-speciﬁc congestion games [3], to weighted congestion games [3], and to
ID-congesiton games [5]. In these, generalized, models, the player’s payoﬀ depends not only
on the number of players choosing his resources but also on the number of players choosing
neighboring resources or on players’ identities.
Although congestion games are central to the computer science and game theory literature,
the above models do not take into consideration the possibility that resources may fail to
execute their assigned tasks. However, in the computer-science context of congestion settings,
where resources are typically represented by machines, computers or communication lines,
resources are obviously prone to failures because of high load, breakage, etc. In order to
address this issue, we introduced a study of resource failures in congestion games [8]. We
presented a model of Congestion Games with Failure [CGFs] that allows to refer to the delay
experienced by users who select a particular resource as a function of the number of players
who select to use it, as well as to the fact that resources may fail with some probability, and
as a result, a player may choose a subset of the resources in order to attempt and perform his
task. This model however did not deal with the issue of costs incurred by selecting a resource.
Needless to say, dealing in the scope of a well deﬁned model with congestion eﬀects, costly
submission, and resource failures, is a desired objective. The model we oﬀer in this paper
incorporates all these features. We call it Taxed Congestion Games with Failures [TCGFs].
In a TCGF there are n agents and m resources. Each agent has a job that he needs to process,
for which he can use each of the resources. Each resource might fail with some probability.
As a result, the agent may decide to submit his job to several resources, maximizing his
probability of success. The processing time of each resource depends on the number of jobs
submitted to that resource, and the agent suﬀers the cost associated with the resource with
the fastest processing time he selected. If all the agent’s selected resources fail (or he has
not selected any resource) then the agent suﬀers some incompletion costs. What makes each
agent’s decision highly non-trivial is that each job submission is costly; that is, in addition
to the cost incurred due to the delay, there is some ﬁxed payment (which we term ”tax”),
which is proportional to the number of selected resources. Therefore, there are two central
issues that come into play in TCGFs:
21. There is a tradeoﬀ between the probability of successful job completion and the (ﬁxed)
costs of submission.
2. While an agent suﬀers delay costs which are proportional only to the processing time
of the fastest resource, submission to many resources by many agents might make the
processing time high due to the increase in congestion level.
The above setting, and the associated tradeoﬀs, capture in a straightforward manner many
realistic situations. This is evidently the situation in the manufacturing domain where re-
sources are machines, and in the context of distributed operating systems, but also in the
service industry, in which a resource may be a courier required to deliver a message.
Notice that TCGFs extend CGFs, but should not be viewed as a generalization of classical
congestion games. This is due to the fact that in both CGFs and TCGFs we care about
the delay incurred by the fastest (the least congested) selected resource which did not fail,
and not about the congestion on all selected resources. Thus, an agent’s payoﬀ function in
CGFs and TCGFs uses the minimum, rather than the sum, operator. A model which extends
classical congestion games to deal with failures via additive payoﬀs is presented in [9].
A major question in the context of models of congestion is the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium. The important result of Rosenthal in [11] is that congestion games always
possess pure strategy Nash equilibria. Monderer and Shapley [6] introduced the notions
of potential function and potential game and proved that the construction of a potential
function is suﬃcient for showing the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. The authors
[6] observed that Rosenthal [11] proved his theorem on congestion games by constructing a
potential function – hence, every congestion game has a potential function. Moreover, they
showed that every ﬁnite potential game is isomorphic to a congestion game. Therefore, the
classes of ﬁnite potential games and congestion games coincide. In cases where a potential
function does not exist, showing the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is typically a
non-trivial issue. Since even the model introduced in [8] does not admit a potential function,
the TCGF-model introduced in this paper (which in particular is a strict generalization of
the former model) does not possess a potential function. Hence, the question of whether a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in TCGFs, as well as the complexity of ﬁnding it, are
of considerable signiﬁcance.
3In this paper, we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in any TCGF, and
present a polynomial time algorithm for constructing such an equilibrium. In addition, we
develop a simple eﬃcient procedure for computing a pure strategy equilibrium in symmetric
TCGFs, where all resources are identical. Our contributions can therefore be summarized as
follows:
1. In Section 2 we introduce the ﬁrst model to capture congestion eﬀects, costly submission,
and resources failures, in a game-theoretic setting.
2. In Section 3 we prove the existence of pure strategy equilibria in any TCGF.
3. We show that pure strategy equilibria can be eﬃciently constructed for TCGFs; this
will be implied by the constructive proof introduced in Section 3.
4. We show an eﬃcient algorithm targeted at symmetric TCGFs. This topic is dealt with
in Section 4.
2 The model
Our model is an extension of the CGF-model [8]. In a CGF, players share a common set
of resources, where each resource may fail with some known probability. Each player has a
task which can be carried out by any of the resources. For reliability reasons, a player may
choose a subset of the resources in order to try and perform his task. The cost of a player
for utilizing any resource is a function of the total number of players using this resource, and
the cost for a player for successful completion of his task is the minimum among the costs
of his successful attempts. The class of CGFs and, in particular, the subclass of symmetric
CGFs, in which the parameters of the game do not depend on the players’ or resources’
identities, does not admit a potential function; that is, CGFs cannot be reduced to classic
congestion games. Nevertheless, as shown in [8], these games always possess a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
We extend the CGF-model by making task submission costly: in a TCGF, each player pays
a ﬁxed cost (tax) for using each of the resources he had chosen, independently of its suc-
cess or failure. Our extension is accompanied by a limiting assumption of identical failure
probabilities. Below we present the formal deﬁnition of the TCGF-model.
4Let N = {1,...,n} be a ﬁnite set of players, and let M = {e1,...,em} be a ﬁnite set of
resources where each resource may fail to execute its assigned tasks with a given failure
probability. We assume that the failure or success of a particular resource is independent of
the failure or success of other resources. We also assume that all the resources possess equal
failure probabilities. We denote the failure probability of each resource by f (0 < f < 1).
Similarly, s = 1 − f stands for the success probability.
The set of pure strategies, Σi, for player i ∈ N is the power set of the set of resources, i.e.
Σi = P(M); the set of pure strategy proﬁles of all players is denoted by Σ. Player i ∈ N
chooses a strategy σi ∈ Σi which is a (possibly empty) subset of the resources. Player i’s
disutility from an uncompleted task is evaluated by his incompletion cost, wi. The service cost
of resource e for each of its users is a nonnegative nondecreasing function le : {1,...,n} → R+
of the congestion experienced by e. In addition, there is a (nonnegative) ﬁxed cost (tax)
(denoted by t) that has to be paid by each player for every resource he uses, independently
of its success or failure.
Let σ ∈ Σ be a strategy proﬁle; the congestion vector that corresponds to σ is h(σ) =
(he(σ))e∈M, where he(σ) represents the total number of users of e in σ. The outcome from
σ is the subset X ⊆ M of the resources that have successfully executed their assigned tasks.
For any player i ∈ N, we say that the execution of player i’s task succeeds if the task of player
i is successfully completed by at least one of the resources chosen by him, i.e. σi ∩ X  = ∅;
otherwise, if σi ∩ X = ∅, player i’s task fails. The disutility for player i from the strategy
proﬁle σ and outcome X, is denoted by πi (σ,X): player i’s disutility from an uncompleted
task is evaluated by his incompletion cost, that is πi (σ,X) = wi; player i’s disutility from a
successful completion of his task is determined by the minimum among the service costs of
his successful resources:
πi (σ,X) = min
e∈σi∩X
le(he(σ)).
The cost for player i incurred by strategy proﬁle σ and outcome X, ci (σ,X), is the sum of
his disutility, πi (σ,X) and the ﬁxed costs (taxes) over the resources he has utilized:
ci (σ,X) = πi (σ,X) +
 
e∈σi
t = πi (σ,X) + |σi|t.
Given a strategy proﬁle σ, let X(σ) denote a random variable representing the subset of
successful resources; X(σ) is distributed over the power set of the resources, P(M), and its
5distribution is determined by f. The expected cost for player i incurred by strategy proﬁle σ,
Ci(σ), is therefore:
Ci(σ) = wif|σi| +
 
A∈P(σi) {∅}
min
e∈A
le (he(σ))s|A|f|σi A| + |σi|t.
For simplicity of exposition, for any subset A ⊆ M of a given set of resources, we further
denote by P(A) the set of all nonempty subsets of A: P(A) = P(A)   {∅}. Then, the
expected cost of player i can be written as
Ci(σ) = wif|σi| +
 
A∈P(σi)
min
e∈A
le (he(σ))s|A|f|σi A| + |σi|t.
The aim of each player is to minimize his own expected cost.
We notice that if player i chooses an empty set σi = ∅ (does not assign his task to any
resource), then his expected cost equals his incompletion cost: Ci(∅,σ−i) = wi. We also note
that any TCGF with zero taxes is a CGF.
As shown in [8], CGFs and, in particular, player- and resource-symmetric (henceforth, ”sym-
metric”) CGFs, are not potential games. Obviously, the subclass of symmetric CGFs is
included in the class of (symmetric) TCGFs, and therefore, TCGFs and, in particular, sym-
metric TCGFs, do not admit a potential function. However, as we show in the next section,
they always possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
3 Pure strategy Nash equilibrium
In this section, we present our main result on TCGFs. We show that these games possess a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, despite the non-existence of a potential function. Our
proof is constructive and yields an O
 
n2m2(nm + mlogm)
 
time procedure for constructing
such an equilibrium in any given TCGF.
We show that TCGFs possess the ”single proﬁtable move property”, previously deﬁned in
[9], implying that a strategy proﬁle which is stable under single moves is a Nash equilibrium.
This signiﬁcantly decreases the size of the strategy set that needs to be examined in order to
obtain an equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that TCGFs possess an additional property,
”the steady DS-stability property” (to be deﬁned in the sequel), that allows us to develop a
6monotone1 iterative algorithm that terminates with a Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle. We
start with the deﬁnition of single moves and their intuitive and technical characterizations.
Deﬁnition 3.1 For any strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ and for any player i ∈ N, adding precisely
one resource to his strategy, σi, is called an A-move of i from σ. Similarly, dropping a single
resource is called a D-move, and switching one resource with another is called an S-move.
Let σ ∈ Σ, i ∈ N and a ∈ σi. We say that a D-move with a is proﬁtable for i if
Ci (σ−i,σi   {a}) < Ci(σ). That is,
wif|σi|−1 +
 
A∈P(σi {a})
min
e∈A
le (he(σ))s|A|f|σi|−|A|−1 + (|σi| − 1)t
< wif|σi| +
 
B∈P(σi)
min
e∈B
le (he(σ))s|B|f|σi|−|B| + |σi|t,
which is equivalent to
 
A∈P(σi {a})
min
e∈A
le (he(σ))s|A|f|σi|−|A|−1 −
 
B∈P(σi)
min
e∈B
le (he(σ))s|B|f|σi|−|B| + wisf|σi|−1 < t. (1)
Note that for any pair of sets X,Y , the next equality holds:
P(X) = P(X ∩ Y ) ∪ P(X   Y ) ∪
 
Ω ∪ Ψ
   Ω ∈ P(X ∩ Y ),Ψ ∈ P(X   Y )
 
. (2)
Using (2), (1) can be rewritten as
 
A∈P(σi {a})
min
e∈A
le (he(σ))s|A|f|σi|−|A|−1 −
 
A∈P(σi {a})
min
e∈A
le (he(σ))s|A|f|σi|−|A|
−
 
A∈P(σi {a})
min
e∈A∪{a}
le (he(σ))s|A|+1f|σi|−|A|−1 + wisf|σi|−1 − la (ha(σ))sf|σi|−1 < t,
which is equivalent to
sf|σi|−1

wi − la (ha(σ)) +
 
A∈P(σi {a})
 
min
e∈A
le (he(σ)) − min
e∈A∪{a}
le (he(σ))
 
s|A|f−|A|

 < t. (3)
Assume a is a successful resource. Then, the left hand side of (3) stands for the diﬀerence
in the expected disutility (cost) of player i, between his strategies σi   {a} and σi. Clearly,
if this value is less than t, the ﬁxed cost of using a, then dropping a is a proﬁtable move for
1That is, the congestion of each resource does not decrease as the algorithm proceeds
7player i. For simplicity of exposition, we use the following notation: for i ∈ N, a ∈ M and
σ ∈ Σ let
Ca
i(σ) = sf|σi|−1

wi − la (ha(σ)) +
 
A∈P(σi {a})
 
min
e∈A
le (he(σ)) − min
e∈A∪{a}
le (he(σ))
 
s|A|f−|A|


denote the marginal cost saving by resource a at proﬁle σ for player i.
Thus, (3) can be rewritten as Ca
i(σ) < t, meaning that relative to σ, dropping a is proﬁtable
for i if (and only if) the ﬁxed cost of using a is greater than its marginal cost saving.
Remark 3.2 Note that due to the monotonicity of le( ) for all e ∈ M, Ca
i( ) (weakly) de-
creases with the congestion on resource a and increases with the congestion on each of the
other resources. The former follows directly from the monotonicity of la( ), and the latter is
implied by the monotonicity of le( ) for all e ∈ σi   {a}, since the following holds for any
A ∈ P(σi   {a}):
min
e∈A
le
 
h′
e
 
− min
e∈A∪{a}
le
 
h′
e
 
≥ min
e∈A
le (he) − min
e∈A∪{a}
le (he),
where h′ and h are congestion vectors satisfying h′
e ≥ he for all e ∈ σi   {a} and h′
a = ha.
We notice that mine∈A le (he(σ)) ≥ mine∈A∪{a} le (he(σ)) for any set A, implying that the
sum in equation (3) is nonnegative. Thus, from (3) we derive
sf|σi|−1 (wi − la (ha(σ))) < t,
which is equivalent to
la (ha(σ)) > wi −
t
sf|σi|−1. (4)
Assume a ∈ argmaxe∈σi le (he(σ)) and assume that a D-move with a is non-proﬁtable for i
(i.e., (3) does not hold). Then, the reverse inequality of (4) is satisﬁed, since mine∈A le (he(σ)) =
mine∈A∪{a} le (he(σ)) for all A ∈ P(σi  {a}). In addition, since la (ha(σ)) ≥ le (he(σ)) for all
e ∈ σi, the above yields le (he(σ)) ≤ wi − t
sf|σi|−1 for any e ∈ σi.
Similar inequalities can be derived for A- and S-moves as follows. An A-move from σ with
resource b / ∈ σi is proﬁtable for i, i.e. Ci (σ−i,σi ∪ {b}) < Ci(σ), if and only if the marginal
cost saving by b at the resulting proﬁle, (σ−i,σi ∪ {b}), is greater than t, the ﬁxed cost,
i.e. Cb
i(σi ∪ {b},σ−i) > t. In a similar way, we conclude that an S-move from a ∈ σi to
b / ∈ σi is proﬁtable for i, if and only if the marginal cost saving by switching from a to b is
positive, or equivalently, if lb (hb(σ) + 1) < la (ha(σ)). We summarize the above discussion in
Observations 3.3 and 3.4 below.
8Observation 3.3 Let i ∈ N, a,b,∈ M and σ ∈ Σ satisfying a ∈ σi and b / ∈ σi. Then,
(1) A D-move with a is proﬁtable for i if and only if Ca
i(σ) < t.
(2) An A-move with b is proﬁtable for i if and only if Cb
i(σi ∪ {b},σ−i) > t.
(3) An S-move from a to b is proﬁtable for i if and only if lb (hb(σ) + 1) < la (ha(σ)).
Observation 3.4 Let i ∈ N, a,b ∈ M and σ ∈ Σ satisfying a ∈ σi and b / ∈ σi. Then,
(1) (i) If a D-move with a is proﬁtable for i, then la (ha(σ)) > wi − t
sf|σi|−1.
(ii) Assume a ∈ argmaxe∈σi le (he(σ)). Then, if a D-move with a is non-proﬁtable for
i, then le (he(σ)) ≤ wi − t
sf|σi|−1 for all e ∈ σi.2
(2) (i) If an A-move with b is non-proﬁtable for i, then lb (hb(σ) + 1) ≥ wi − t
sf|σi|.3
(ii) Assume hb(σ) + 1 ≥ he(σ) for all e ∈ σi. Then, the reverse of the above inequality
holds, if an A-move with b is proﬁtable for i.
The following lemma implies that any strategy proﬁle, in which no player wishes unilaterally
to apply a single A-, D- or S-move, is a Nash equilibrium. More precisely, we show that if
there exists a player who beneﬁts from a unilateral deviation from a given strategy proﬁle,
then there exists a single A-, D- or S-move which is proﬁtable for him as well. This property
is called the ”single proﬁtable move property” [9].
Lemma 3.5 (The single proﬁtable move property) Given a TCGF, let σ ∈ Σ be a
strategy proﬁle which is not in equilibrium, and let i ∈ N be a player for which a proﬁtable
deviation from σ is available. Then, there is a proﬁtable single move from σ available to i.
The idea behind the proof is as follows. Assume on the contrary that σ possesses only non-
single-move deviations. Each such deviation can be decomposed into a series of single moves.
Consider such a deviation, say σ′, with a shortest decomposition. Obviously, inverting any
of the single moves is strictly non-proﬁtable with respect to σ′ (otherwise, it could have been
2It is strictly non-proﬁtable if and only if the inequality is strict.
3Same as above.
9omitted from the original deviation to result a shorter decomposition). This, as we show
below, implies the existence of a proﬁtable single move from the original proﬁle, σ. The
formal proof follows.
Proof: Let σ ∈ Σ be a strategy proﬁle which is not in equilibrium and let i ∈ N be a
player who can beneﬁt from a unilateral deviation from σ. Let PDi(σ) denote the set of all
proﬁtable deviations of i from σ, that is
PDi(σ) = {xi ∈ Σi : Ci(σ−i,xi) < Ci(σ)}.
For any pair of sets A and B, let µ(A,B) = max{|A   B|,|B   A|}. Clearly, if player i
deviates from strategy σi to strategy xi by applying a single A-, D- or S-move, then µ(xi,σi) =
1, and vice versa, if µ(xi,σi) = 1 then xi is obtained from σi by applying exactly one such
move.
Let yi ∈ argminxi∈PDi(σ) µ(xi,σi), and assume µ(yi,σi) > 1. Then, the following three
inequalities hold for any a ∈ σi and b / ∈ σi:
Ci(σ−i,σi   {a}) ≥ Ci(σ); (5)
Ci(σ−i,σi ∪ {b}) ≥ Ci(σ); (6)
Ci (σ−i,(σi   {a}) ∪ {b}) ≥ Ci(σ). (7)
We consider separately each of the following three cases: (i) |σi yi| > |yi σi|, (ii) |yi σi| >
|σi   yi|, and (iii) |yi   σi| = |σi   yi|.
Case (i): Let a ∈ σi yi, and consider the strategy proﬁle y′
i = yi∪{a} obtained by inverting
the D-move with a from σ. Clearly, µ(y′
i,σi) = |σi  y′
i| < |σi  yi| = µ(yi,σi). Hence, by the
choice of yi, Ci(σ−i,y′
i) > Ci(σ−i,yi), implying by Observation 3.4(2),
la(ha(σ)) > wi −
t
sf|yi|. (8)
Let ¯ a ∈ argmaxe∈σi le(he(σ)). By (5) and Observation 3.4(1),
l¯ a(h¯ a(σ)) ≤ wi −
t
sf|σi|−1 ⇒ la(ha(σ)) ≤ wi −
t
sf|σi|−1. (9)
Now, |yi| ≤ |σi| − 1 (since |σi   yi| > |yi   σi|) impling that (8) contradicts (9).
Case (ii): Let b ∈ argmaxe∈yi σi le(he(σ) + 1). By (6) and Observation 3.4(2) we get
lb(hb + 1) ≥ wi −
t
sf|σi|. (10)
10In addition, (7) and Observation 3.3(3) imply lb(hb+1) ≥ la(ha) for all a ∈ σi. This, coupled
with the choice of b, implies that b ∈ argmaxe∈yi le(he(σ−i,yi)).
Consider the strategy proﬁle y′′
i = yi   {b} obtained by inverting the A-move with b from σ.
Clearly, µ(y′′
i ,σi) = |y′′
i   σi| < |yi   σi| = µ(yi,σi). Hence, by the choice of yi, Ci(σ−i,y′′
i ) >
Ci(σ−i,yi), implying by b ∈ argmaxe∈yi le(he(σ−i,yi) and Observation 3.4(1) that
lb(hb + 1) < wi −
t
sf|yi|−1. (11)
Now, |σi| ≤ |yi| − 1 (since |yi   σi| > |σi   yi|) implies that (11) contradicts (10).
Case (iii): Let a ∈ σi   yi and b ∈ yi   σi, and consider y′′′
i = (yi   {b}) ∪ {a}. Clearly,
µ(y′′′
i ,σi) < µ(yi,σi). Hence, by the choice of yi, Ci(σ−i,y′′′
i ) > Ci(σ−i,yi), implying by
Observation 3.3(3) that la(ha) > lb(hb + 1). This, in turn, yields Ci(σ−i,σ′
i) < Ci(σ), in
contradiction to (7). This completes the proof. ￿
Based on Lemma 3.5, in order to prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, it
suﬃces to present an A-, D- and S-stable strategy proﬁle, as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 3.6 A strategy proﬁle σ is said to be A-stable (resp., D-stable, S-stable) if
there are no players with a proﬁtable A- (resp., D-, S-) move from σ.
We notice that the strategy proﬁle σ0 = (∅,...,∅) is D- and S-stable (henceforth, ”DS-
stable”), so the subset of DS-stable proﬁles is not empty. Our goal is to ﬁnd a DS-stable
proﬁle for which no proﬁtable A-move exists, implying this proﬁle is in equilibrium. Using
the above, we develop an iterative algorithm having the following properties:
• The input and the output of each iteration of the algorithm is DS-stable.
• The congestion of each resource e ∈ M does not decrease as the algorithm proceeds.
• The algorithm terminates with a Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
Below we present our TNE-algorithm that ﬁnds a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a given
TCGF. Let us start with its brief description. The TNE-algorithm is initialized with σ0 =
(∅,...,∅), and each of its iterations begins with a DS-stable strategy proﬁle (see Lemma
113.7 in the sequel). Let σ represent the input of an iteration of the TNE-algorithm, and let
h denote its corresponding congestion vector (h = h(σ)). The algorithm sorts the set of all
resources e ∈ M with he < n in a non-decreasing order of le(he +1). For each player i, let ei
be the smallest resource (according to the current order) not in σi. Observe that if there is a
proﬁtable A-move of i from σ then the A-move with ei is a most proﬁtable move for him. If
there are no proﬁtable A-moves for any player, then σ is a Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle
and the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, let ¯ N denote the set of all players who wish to
apply an A-move, and let emin = min{ei : i ∈ ¯ N}. The algorithm selects from ¯ N a player iA
with eiA = emin, and adds resource emin to his strategy. If the resulting strategy proﬁle, σ′,
is DS-stable, then the algorithm proceeds to the next iteration. Otherwise, if σ′ is not DS-
stable (see Figure 1), it needs to be stabilized. As proved in Lemma 3.7 (Claim 3.10), the only
A-stable
S-stable
DS-stable
D-stable
A-move
Figure 1: Applying an A-move to a DS-stable proﬁle may destroy the DS-stability.
potential cause for the in-DS-stability of σ′ is the existence of a player who wishes to apply a
D- or S-move with emin. Let   N denote the set of players who wish to make such a change in
their strategies. The algorithm selects player jD from   N, and removes resource emin from his
strategy. Then, Lemma 3.7(Claim 3.11) shows that the resulting strategy proﬁle, σ′′, is DS-
stable (see Figure 2), and the algorithm proceeds to the next iteration. We note in Remark
3.12 in the sequel, that splitting each S-move into a D-move that is followed by an A-move in
the following iteration, does not eﬀect the outcome of the algorithm. Therefore, our procedure
considers, in fact, only two kinds of operations: additions and deletions. Furthermore, Lemma
3.8 shows that the algorithm stops with a Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle, and enables us
to derive the time complexity of the algorithm. The TNE-algorithm is presented below.
12A-stable
S-stable
DS-stable
D-stable
A-move
D-move
Figure 2: The DS-stability can be ﬁxed by a single D-move.
TNE-algorithm
Initiali- For all i ∈ N, set σi := ∅;
zation: For all e ∈ M set he := 0;
Main [1] Set ¯ M := {e ∈ M : he < n};
step: [2] Reorder ¯ M according to the rule
x ≤ y ⇔ lx(hx + 1) ≤ ly(hy + 1);
[3] For all i ∈ N, set ei := min{x : x / ∈ σi};
[4] If Ci(σ−i,σi ∪ {ei}) ≥ Ci(σ)
for all i ∈ N, then QUIT;
[5] Set ¯ N := {i ∈ N : Ci(σ−i,σi ∪ {ei}) < Ci(σ)};
[6] Set emin := min{ei : i ∈ ¯ N};
[7] Select iA ∈ {i ∈ ¯ N : ei = emin};
σiA := σiA ∪ {emin};
hemin := hemin + 1;
[8] If (σ−iA,σiA ∪ {emin}) is DS-stable,
then go to (1);
13[9] Set   N := {j ∈ N : Cj(σ) > Cj(σ−j,σj   {emin}) or
∃u ∈ ¯ M   σj, Cj(σ) > Cj(σ−j,(σj   {emin}) ∪ {u})};
[10] Select jD ∈   N;
[11] Set σjD := σjD   {emin};
hemin := hemin − 1, and go to [3].
Lemmas 3.7 and 3.8 below are central for proving the correctness of the TNE-algorithm. For
the reason of exposition, we have chosen to present their proofs at the end of this section.
Lemma 3.7 The output of each iteration of the TNE-algorithm is a DS-stable proﬁle.
The proof consists of two parts. We start by showing that the only potential cause for an
in-DS-stability of a proﬁle obtained by an A-move from a DS-stable proﬁle is the existence of
a player, say player j, who used the added resource before the addition operation and wishes
to drop it after it had been added by another player (see Claim 3.10). We proceed by showing
that if such player j exists, then if he removes the added resource from his strategy then the
resulting proﬁle is DS-stable (see Claim 3.11). Thus, Lemma 3.7 implies the existence of a
monotone procedure with its inputs and outputs at each iteration being DS-stable strategy
proﬁles.
Clearly, the congestion of each resource does not decrease as the algorithm proceeds. There-
fore, in order to prove that the algorithm terminates after ﬁnitely many iterations, it suﬃces
to show that every sequence of iterations with a constant congestion is ﬁnite. This statement
follows from Lemma 3.8, implying that once a player has added a resource to his strategy
set, he will not remove it, unless the congestion in the system has been changed.
Lemma 3.8 Let σk represents the input of the k’th iteration of the TNE-algorithm with hk
being its corresponding congestion vector, and let p = ik
A be a player who adds resource ek
min
to his strategy σk
p at the beginning of the k’th iteration. Then, every e ≤ ek
min satisﬁes e ∈ σr
p
for all r > k with hr = hk. That is, player p uses all the resources ordered less than ek
min, as
long as the congestion in the system has not been changed.
We turn now to present our main result.
14Theorem 3.9 The TNE-algorithm ﬁnds a pure strategy Nash-equilibrium in a given TCGF
in time O
 
n2m2(nm + mlogm)
 
.
Proof: Validity Let σ be the output of the TNE-algorithm. The algorithm halts if and only
if there are no players who wish to unilaterally apply an A-move from σ. That is, σ is an
A-stable strategy proﬁle. In addition, by Lemma 3.7, σ is DS-stable. Thus, by Lemma 3.5,
σ is a Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
Complexity Each iteration of the algorithm takes O(nm+mlogm) operations for reordering
the resources and applying an A- and a D-move. We show below that the number of iterations
is bounded by (nm)2. Since the congestion of the resources do not decrease as the algorithm
proceeds, the number of possible congestion combinations of the resources (congestion vec-
tors) is bounded by nm. Assume the algorithm starts a new iteration and let h denote the
current congestion vector. By Lemma 3.8, a player that adds a resource, at the beginning of
the iteration, will not remove it as long as the congestion of the resources remains h. Thus,
preserving the same congestion vector, the algorithm can replace the users of each resource at
most once. Therefore, the number of iterations with the same congestion vector is bounded
by nm, and the complexity of the TNE-algorithm is O
 
n2m2(nm + mlogm)
 
. ￿
We proceed with the proofs of Lemmas 3.7 and 3.8.
Proof of Lemma 3.7: The proof is by induction on the iteration depth. For the ﬁrst
iteration the proof is immediate. The input of the ﬁrst iteration is σ = (∅,...,∅) which
is obviously DS-stable. If no player wishes to apply an A-move then the output of the ﬁrst
iteration is σ. Otherwise, if there is a player iA, who wishes to apply an A-move with resource
emin, then the output of the ﬁrst iteration is a strategy proﬁle σ′ = (σ−iA,σiA ∪ {emin}). In
this case, CiA(σ−iA,σiA ∪ {emin}) < CiA(σ), impling that a D-move with emin from σ′ is
not proﬁtable for iA. By the TNE-algorithm, lemin(1) ≤ le(1), for all e ∈ M. This yields
CiA(σ−iA,σiA ∪ {emin}) ≤ CiA(σ−iA,σiA ∪ {e}), for all e ∈ M. That is, iA does not wish to
apply an S-move with emin from σ′. Since all other players have nothing to drop or exchange,
the strategy proﬁle σ′ – the output of the ﬁrst iteration – is DS-stable.
Now we assume that the input of the k’th iteration (k > 1) is DS-stable and show that so is
its output. Let σ be the DS-stable input of the k’th iteration. If no player wishes to apply
an A-move then the output of the k’th iteration is σ. Otherwise, player iA adds resource
15emin to his strategy. For simplicity of notation, let us denote iA by i and emin by a, and let
σ′ = (σ−i,σi ∪ {a}). Then,
Claim 3.10 Let j ∈ N   {i}. Then, the only potential proﬁtable D- or S- move by j from
σ′ is with a.
Proof: Let b ∈ σ′
j {a} = σj {a}. By the D-stability of σ and Observation 3.3(1), Cb
j(σ) ≥ t.
Recall that σ′ = (σ−i,σi ∪ {a}), hence he(σ′) = he(σ) for all e ∈ M   {a} and ha(σ′) =
ha(σ) + 1, implying he(σ′) ≥ he(σ) for all e ∈ M and hb(σ′) = hb(σ) (since b  = a). Then,
by Remark 3.2, Cb
j(σ′) ≥ Cb
j(σ) ≥ t, implying by Observation 3.3(1) that a D-move with b is
non-proﬁtable for j.
By the S-stability of σ and Observation 3.3(3), for any resource c / ∈ σj = σ′
j we have lc(hc(σ)+
1) ≥ lb(hb(σ)). Now, since he(σ′) ≥ he(σ) for all e ∈ M and hb(σ′) = hb(σ), the above yields
lc(hc(σ′)+1) ≥ lb(hb(σ′)), implying by Observation 3.3(3) the non-proﬁtability of an S-move
from resource b.
Thus, no player j  = i wishes to apply a D- or S-move from any resource b ∈ σ′
j = σj, b  = a.
￿Claim3.10
If no player j  = i wishes to apply a D- or S-move with the added resource a, then the output of
the k’th iteration is the strategy proﬁle σ′ = (σ−i,σi∪{a}). In this case, we complete the proof
by showing that player i also does not wish to apply any D- or S-move. Clearly, after adding
resource a, player i does not wish to drop it. Recall that a ∈ argmin{le(he + 1) : e / ∈ σi},
which yields Ci(σ′) ≤ Ci(σ′
i,(σ′
i   {a}) ∪ {e}) for any e / ∈ σ′
i, implying that player i does
not wish to exchange resource a by any other resource. It remains to show that i does not
wish to drop or exchange any resource b ∈ σ′
i   {a} = σi. This follows from the fact that
Ci(σ′) < Ci(σ) and the σ’s S-stability, which imply the following:
(i) Ci(σ′) < Ci(σ) ≤ Ci(σ−i,(σi   {b}) ∪ {a}) = Ci(σ′
−i,σ′
i   {b});
(ii) Ci(σ) ≤ Ci(σ−i,(σi   {b}) ∪ {e}), for all e / ∈ σi. By Observation 3.3(3), this yields
lb(hb(σ)) ≤ le(he(σ) + 1) for all e / ∈ σi and, in particular, for all e / ∈ σ′
i. Now, since
he(σ′) ≥ he(σ) for all e ∈ M and hb(σ′) = hb(σ), the above yields lb(hb(σ′)) ≤ le(he(σ′)+
1), implying Ci(σ′) ≤ Ci(σ′
−i,(σ′
i   {b}) ∪ {e}), for all e / ∈ σ′
i.
16If there exists player jD who wishes to apply a D- or S-move with the added resource a, then
the output of the algorithm is a strategy proﬁle σ′′ = (σ′
−jD,σ′
jD   {a}) which is obtained
from σ′ by the D-move of jD from a.4 For simplicity of notation, we denote jD by j. Then,
Claim 3.11 (The steady DS-stability property) The strategy proﬁle σ′′ is DS-stable.
Proof: Note that σ′′ = (σ−{i,j},σi ∪ {a},σj   {a}), hence σ′′ and σ have the same congestion
vector, and all players in N   {i,j} do not distinguish between σ′′ and σ. Therefore, it
remains to show the DS-stability of σ′′ with respect to players i and j. For simplicity of
exposition, let us denote the congestion vector of σ′′ and σ by h (h = h(σ) = h(σ′′)).
Consider player i. By the S-stability of σ and Observation 3.3(3),
le(he) ≤ le′(he′ + 1) (12)
for all e ∈ σi and e′ / ∈ σi, and, in particular, for all e ∈ σ′′   {a} and e′ / ∈ σ′′
i . Since
a ∈ argmin{le′(he′ + 1) : e′ / ∈ σi}, then la(ha + 1) ≤ le′(he′ + 1) for all e′ / ∈ σi. By the
monotonicity of le( ) for all e ∈ M, la(ha) ≤ le′(he′ + 1) for all e′ / ∈ σi, and, in particular,
for all e′ / ∈ σ′′
i . Thus, for all e ∈ σ′′ and e′ / ∈ σ′′
i we get le(he) ≤ le′(he′ + 1) and Ci(σ′′) ≤
Ci(σ′′
−i,(σ′′
i  {e})∪{e′}), implying that player i does not wish to apply any S-move from σ′′.
By Ci(σ′) < Ci(σ) and the monotonicity of le( ) for all e ∈ M,
la(ha) ≤ la(ha + 1) ⇒ Ci(σ′′) ≤ Ci(σ′) < Ci(σ) = Ci(σ′′
−i,σ′′
i   {a}),
implying that player i does not wish to apply a D-move with resource a. We show now that
this holds for all other resources in σ′′
i .
By (12), la(ha + 1) ≥ le(he) for all e ∈ σi. Then, By Ci(σ′) < Ci(σ) and Observation 3.4(2),
la(ha + 1) < wi −
t
sf|σi|. (13)
Let b ∈ σ′′
i   {a} = σi. By (13) and la(ha +1) ≥ lb(hb) we have lb(hb) < wi − t
sf|σi|, implying
lb(hb) < wi − t
sf
|σ′′
i |−1 (since |σi| = |σ′′
i | − 1). Thus, by Observation 3.4(1), the D-move with
b from σ′′ is non-proﬁtable for i.
4Notice that the algorithm applies a D-move of player jD from resource a even if jD would prefer to
exchange a by another resource. If this is the case, then at next iteration jD will be the only player with a
proﬁtable A-move and will be selected by the algorithm to apply it (see Remark 3.12 following this proof).
That is, the desirable by jD S-move is just split into two iterations.
17Consider now player j. Assume ﬁrst that a D-move with a from σ′ is proﬁtable for j. In this
case we derive the DS-stability of σ′′ directly from the DS-stability of σ. More precisely, by
the D-stability of σ and Observation 3.3(2), for all e ∈ σj and, in particular, for all e ∈ σ′′
j we
get le(he) ≤ wj − t
sf
|σj|−1 < wj − t
sf
|σ′′
j |−1, where the latter inequality follows since |σ′′
j| > |σj|.
Therefore, no proﬁtable D-move from σ′′ is available to j.
By the S-stability of σ and Observation 3.3(3), for any e ∈ σj and e′ ∈ M   σj we have
le(he) ≤ le′(he′ + 1), implying that no proﬁtable S-move from σ′′ with e ∈ σ′′
j and e′ ∈
(M   σ′′
j)   {a} is available to j. By the proﬁtability of the D-move with a from σ′ and the
D-stability of σ, we get la(ha+1) > wi− t
sf
|σj|−1 and le(he) ≤ wi− t
sf
|σj|−1 for any e ∈ σj and,
in particular, for any e ∈ σ′′
j, implying that la(ha + 1) > le(he). Therefore, we can conclude
that no proﬁtable S-move with e ∈ σ′′
j and a is available to j, completing the proof of the
S-stability of σ′′ in this case.
Otherwise, if the D-move with a is not proﬁtable for j, then there is a proﬁtable S-move from
a to c / ∈ σ′′
j, implying that
lc(hc + 1) < la(ha + 1). (14)
As in the previous case, the D-stability of σ′′ w.r.t player j follows directly from the D-
stability of σ. Let us proceed and prove the S-stability of σ′′ w.r.t j. Assume on the contrary
that j wants to switch resource v ∈ σ′′
j with resource u ∈ M   σ′′
j. Then, by Observation
3.3(3),
lu(hu + 1) < lv(hv). (15)
If u  = a then (15) contradicts (12). Otherwise, by (14) and (12), la(ha + 1) > lv(hv), in
contradiction to (15). ￿Claim3.11
This completes the proof of the lemma. ￿Lemma3.7
Remark 3.12 Consider the k’th iteration of the algorithm, where an A-move of player ik
A
with resource ek
min destabilizes the system. If after adding ik
A to ek
min player jk
D prefers to
remove ek
min from his strategy, then he will not wish to add it to his strategy at the next
iteration, i.e. jk
D / ∈ ¯ Nk+1. Otherwise, if after adding ik
A to ek
min player jk
D prefers to switch
18resource ek
min with another resource u / ∈ σjk
D, then we show that the S-move can be split into
two moves, a D-move and an A-move. Note that lu(hu+1) < lek
min(hek
min+1) implies u < ek
min,
and therefore, at the next iteration, jk
D will be the single player in the set {i ∈ ¯ Nk+1 : ei =
ek+1
min}. Hence, at the next iteration (k + 1), player jk
D will be selected by the algorithm as
player ik+1
A and he will add resource u to his strategy. Thus, splitting the S-move into a
D-move and an A-move does not eﬀect the process.
Proof of Lemma 3.8: Consider player p = ik
A who adds resource ek
min to his strategy σk
p
at the beginning of the k’th iteration. For any e ≤ ek
min, we prove below that e ∈ σr
p for all
r > k such that hr = hk. Since ek
min / ∈ σk
p, we get σr  = σk for all such r, implying there are
no cycles in the TNE-algorithm.
Assume on the contrary that player p removes some resource e ≤ ek
min from his strategy set,
before or at the r’th iteration. Let k < s ≤ r be the ﬁrst iteration at which such a D-move is
applied. Then, this change is caused by an A-move of player q = is
A with resource es
min ∈ σs
p.
Let σs+ = (σs
−q,σs
q ∪ {es
min}). Since by the algorithm every e ≤ es
min satisﬁes e ∈ σs
p, player
p cannot improve his payoﬀ by switching resource es
min with another resource, but only by
removing es
min from σs
p. Then, Cp(σs+) > Cp(σs−), where σs− = (σs+
−p,σs+
p   {es
min}). By
Observation 3.4(1), this implies
les
min(hes
min + 1) > wp −
t
sf|σ
s+
p |−1. (16)
Let k ≤ l < s be the last iteration where player p adds a resource to his strategy, before
dropping resource es
min (recall that player p applies an A-move at the k’th iteration). Then,
Cp(σl+) ≤ Cp(σl), where σl+ = (σl
−p,σl
p ∪ {el
min}). By Observation 3.4(2), this implies
lel
min(hel
min + 1) ≤ wp −
t
sf|σl
p|. (17)
Since |σs+
p | ≤ |σl
p| + 1, (16) and (17) imply
les
min(hes
min + 1) > wp −
t
sf|σ
s+
p |−1 ≥ wp −
t
sf|σl
p| ≥ lel
min(hel
min + 1),
in contradiction to les
min(hes
min + 1) ≤ lel
min(hel
min + 1). ￿
4 Symmetric TCGFs
In this section we consider symmetric TCGFs. In a symmetric TCGF, the parameters of
the game are not a function of the player or the resource identities, i.e. for all i ∈ N and
19e ∈ M we have wi = w and le(k) = l(k) for all k ∈ {0,1,...,n}. Clearly, the TNE-algorithm
is valid for symmetric TCGFs. However, for these, relatively simple, games, we present a
signiﬁcantly simpler algorithm – the STNE-algorithm – which easily ﬁnds a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium proﬁle.
The algorithm is initialized with an empty strategy for each player. It orders the set
N × M = {(i,e) : i ∈ N,e ∈ M} of pairs of players and resources, according to the
rule described in the sequel. Then, using this order, it oﬀers the players a resource to be
added to their strategy. If the corresponding A-move of resource e to strategy σi of player i
does not deteriorate his payoﬀ, the algorithm updates his strategy and proceeds to the next
pair. The algorithm halts upon the ﬁrst decline. The STNE-algorithm is presented below.
For simplicity of notation, we denote a(mod b) by [a]b.
STNE-algorithm
Initiali- For all i ∈ N, set σi := ∅;
zation: Set k := 0;
Main 1. Set k := k + 1.
step: If k > gcd(m,n), then QUIT;
2. Set q := 1;
(a) Let e(q) = e[q+k−1]m;
(b) If C[q]n(σ−[q]n,σ[q]n ∪ {e(q)}) ≤ C[q]n(σ)
then set σ[q]n := σ[q]n ∪ {e(q)};
Otherwise, QUIT;
(c) Set q := q + 1. If q > lcm(m,n)
then go to 1. Otherwise, go to (a).
The procedure of ordering the set N × M is illustrated by the following example. Suppose
there are n = 9 players and m = 6 resources. We deﬁne an order in which we oﬀer the players
to add a resource to their strategy as follows (see Figure 3). We assign the players to the
resources by ﬁrst assigning player 1 to resource e1, then player 2 is assigned to resource e2,
and so on until player 6 is assigned to the last resource – e6. Then we continue with player 7
going to resource e1, player 8 to e2, and the last player – player 9 – gets resource e3. We start
a new sequence by assigning player 1 to resource e4, and so on until at the end of the ﬁrst
20e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8
9
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 1
2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9
Figure 3: Example for the implementation of the STNE-algorithm.
iteration, player 9 is assigned to resource e6. At the next iteration, we start a new sequence
by moving the players by one step: namely, player 1 is assigned to resource e2, player 2 is
assigned to resource e3, and at the end of the iteration, player 9 is assigned to resource e1.
The length of each iteration is bounded by the least common multiplier of m and n, and the
number of iterations is bounded by the greatest common divider of m and n.
Theorem 4.1 The STNE-algorithm ﬁnds a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a given sym-
metric TCGF in O(nm).
Proof: First, we show that the STNE-algorithm does not assign a player to a particular
resource more than once and thus provides a feasible assignment. Assume this is not true.
Then, either there exist q1,q2 such that q1+k−1 ≡ q2+k−1(mod m), where q1 ≡ q2(mod n),
or there are k1 and k2 such that q1 +k1 −1 ≡ q2 +k2 −1(mod m), where q1 ≡ q2(mod n). In
the ﬁrst case, q1 + k − 1 ≡ q2 + k − 1(mod m) ⇒ q1 ≡ q2(mod m). That is, q1 − q2 divides
both m and n, and therefore q1 − q2 ≥ lcm(m,n). But since q1 ≤ lcm(m,n) and q2 ≥ 1, we
get q1−q2 < lcm(m,n), a contradiction. In the second case, q1+k1−1 ≡ q2+k2−1(mod m)
⇒ q1 − q2 ≡ k2 − k1(mod m). That is, k2 − k1 divides gcd(m,n), and therefore k2 − k1 ≥
gcd(m,n). But since k2 ≤ gcd(m,n) and k1 ≥ 1, we get k2−k1 < gcd(m,n), a contradiction.
21The above also implies that the time complexity of the algorithm is O(nm), since a player is
assigned to a resource at most once, without reordering neither players nor resources. One
can also notice that the length of each iteration of the algorithm is bounded by lcm(m,n), and
the number of iterations is bounded by gcd(m,n), leading to the same bound of complexity
of the algorithm.
Next we show that the output of the STNE-algorithm is a Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
First, we prove that the output of each step of the algorithm is DS-stable. Then we show
that the algorithm terminates with an A-stable strategy proﬁle. Thus, by the single proﬁtable
move property, the resulting combination of strategies is a Nash equilibrium.
Let σr be the output of the r’th step of the STNE-algorithm, and let hr denote the corre-
sponding congestion vector (hr = h(σr)). We show below that σr is DS-stable. The proof
uses the induction principle. For r = 1 the proof is immediate. At the ﬁrst step, the algorithm
oﬀers player 1 to add resource e1 to his strategy. If the algorithm receives decline, then the
resulting strategy proﬁle of the ﬁrst step is σ1 = (∅,...,∅) which is obviously DS-stable. If
player 1 adds resource e1 to his strategy then
C1 ({e1},∅,...,∅) = wf + sl(1) < w = C1 (∅,...,∅).
This implies that player 1 does not wish to drop resource e1. By the symmetry between
resources, player 1 does not want to switch resource e1 with any other resource. That is,
C1 ({e1},∅,...,∅) = wf + sl(1) = C1 ({e},...,∅),
for all e ∈ M. Other players have nothing to drop or exchange. Thus, σ1 is DS-stable.
Now we prove our statement for r > 1. Assume that at the r’th step the algorithm oﬀers
player i to add resource a to his strategy. If the algorithm receives decline, then σr = σr−1,
and σr is DS-stable by induction. Otherwise, player i adds resource a to his strategy. Then,
Ci(σr−1
−i ,σr−1
i ∪ {a}) = Ci(σr) ≤ Ci(σr−1) = Ci(σr
−i,σr
i   {a}). (18)
We show below that no player wishes to apply a D-move from σr; that is, Cj(σr) ≤ Cj(σr
−j,σr
j 
{e}), for all j ∈ N, e ∈ σj. Note that hr
a ≥ hr
e for all e ∈ M. Then, by (18) and Observation
3.4(1), we get l(hr
e) ≤ w− t
sf
|σr
i |−1 for all e ∈ σr
i. Now, since for all j ∈ N the STNE-algorithm
22satisﬁes |σr
j| ≤ |σr
i|, for any j ∈ N and e ∈ σr
j the above yields l(hr
e) ≤ w − t
sf
|σr
j|−1, implying
by Observation 3.4(1) the non-proﬁtability of a D-move of j from σr. Thus, since no player
in N wishes to apply a D-move, σr is D-stable.
We note that the STNE-algorithm satisﬁes hr
e ≤ hr
e′ + 1 for all e,e′ ∈ M. Then, Observation
3.3 implies that Cj(σr) ≤ Cj(σr
−j,(σr
j  {e})∪{e′}) holds for all j ∈ N, e ∈ σr
j, e′ / ∈ σr
j. That
is, no player wishes to apply an S-move from σr, implying that σr is S-stable.
It remains to show that the last iteration of the STNE-algorithm produces an A-stable strat-
egy proﬁle, σ. Assume that at the last iteration the algorithm oﬀers player i to add resource
a to his strategy, and receives decline. Then, by Observation 3.4(2), l(ha(σ)+1) > w− t
sf|σi|.
Now, since the STNE-algorithm satisﬁes he ≥ ha for all e ∈ M and |σj| ≥ |σi| for all j ∈ N,
the above yields l(he(σ)+1) > w− t
sf
|σj| for all e ∈ M, j ∈ N. Recall that he(σ)+1 ≥ he′(σ)
for all e,e′ ∈ M. Thus, by Observation 3.4(2), the above implies the non-proﬁtability of an
A-move from σ.
Thus, the resulting strategy proﬁle of the STNE-algorithm is A-, D- and S-stable. By Lemma
3.5, this strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium. ￿
5 Summary and Future Research
In this paper, we introduced and studied congestion settings with unreliable resources, in
which resource usage is costly. This study is motivated by a variety of situations in which
a ﬁxed payment for utilizing resources is demanded by their owners or, alternatively, there
is some central coordinator that imposes taxes in order to achieve better social results. We
deﬁned the class of taxed congestion games with failures [TCGFs] which refers to congestion
eﬀects, resource failures, and costly submission, in a uniﬁed game-theoretic setting. Our
model extends on the model presented in [8] by considering submission costs (taxes). We
proved that TCGFs possess pure strategy Nash equilibria, despite the non-existence of a
potential function. Our proof is constructive and yields an eﬃcient non-trivial procedure for
constructing such equilibria in these games. We also introduced a simpliﬁed eﬃcient algo-
rithm for the case of symmetric TCGFs.
23Future research may evaluate the (in)eﬃciency of Nash equilibria in TCGFs (e.g. the price
of anarchy, the price of stability etc.) and develop methods for improving the social outcome
obtained by selﬁsh players. In this context, it may be of interest to formulate meaningful
conditions under which resource taxation can reduce the total cost suﬀered in equilibrium.
Other future research directions may include the study of the existence of strong equilibrium
and coalition-proof equilibrium in TCGFs. While strong equilibrium does not exist in any
TCGF, it may be of interest to ﬁnd cases when it exists; the study of the existence of
coalition-proof equilibrium in TCGFs is a pending complementary project.
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